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RECENT CASES
BANKS AND BANKING-LIEN

OF BANK

COMMISSIONER AGAINST LAND

HELD BY SHAREHOLDER SUBJECT TO A RESULTING TRusT-Defendant, state

bank commissioner, was in possession of the assets of a bank for the purpose of
liquidation. C, the owner of several shares of the bank's stock, had the record
title to land as to which there was a purchase money resulting trust in favor of
plaintiff. Defendant, without knowledge of plaintiff's secret equity, recorded I a
statement claiming a lien against the land on account of C's liability as shareholder
of the bank. Thereafter, C conveyed the property to plaintiff. In an action to
remove the cloud from plaintiff's title, defendant counterclaimed to foreclose the
lien. Held, that the lien against the property was valid, being upon the same
footing as that of a purchaser for value. Fleming v. McFerson,28 P. (2d) 1ol3
(Colo. 1933).
Ordinarily, a lien attaches to only the actual and not the apparent interest
of the debtor in the property.2 Most recording statutes, however, have qualified
this rule with the exception that a bona fide lienor for value against the holder

of the record title takes free of unrecorded equities, 3 an exception apparently not
satisfied by the mere recordation of a statutory lien unaccompanied by any receipt
of value by the debtor. Though the Colorado conveyancing act is very broad in
the class of persons and kind of rights that are protected by reliance upon the
record title to real estate and seemingly eliminates the requirement of value as
a condition to such protection, 4 provision is made for the recordation of instruments or documents in writing only, and an interest created by implication of law,
as the resulting trust in the principal case, is not within the statute.'
It has been
:'In proper accordance with the provisions of the Colorado statute. CoLo. ANN. STAT.
(Mills, 1930) § 355.
' This is the general rule with respect to judgment liens. Wiltshire v. Warburton, 59 F.
(2d) 611 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932) ; Whitney v. Sherman, 178 Cal. 435, 173 Pac. 931 (igi8) ;
Robisson v. Miller, 158 Pa. 377, 27 At. 887 (1893) ; 2 FmEaXAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925)
§ 969. It was upon such judgment creditor cases that the court itself relied to come to a contrary conclusion. It is significant that the decision in McMurtrie v. Riddell, 9 Colo. 497, 13
Pac. 181 (1887), enunciating the doctrine that a judgment creditor had the rights of a bona
fide purchaser for value, was founded on a statute making agreements affecting real estate,
until recorded, invalid as to subsequent "bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers by mortgage, judgment or otherwise not having notice thereof". CoLo. GEN. STAT. (1883) § 215. The
judgment creditor's rights, being specifically stated in the statute, could not be frustrated.
The McMurtrie case was followed in Wedman v. Carpenter, 65 Colo. 63, 173 Pac. 57 (IgI8).
Both of these cases, relied upon in the instant decision, were based upon a statute which was
repealed in 1927.
'Hunter v. State Bank of Florida, 65 Fla. 202, 61 So. 497 (913) ; cf. Teller v. Hill, i&
Colo. App. 509, 72 Pac. 811 (19o3).
'"All deeds . . . or other instruments in writing . . . affecting the title to real
property . . . may be recorded . . . and no such instrument or document shall be valid
as against any class of persons with any kind of rights, except between the parties thereto,
and such as have notice thereof . . ." CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 838d.
'The decisions on the effect of recording statutes on such interests are substantially conflicting. It is held that the recording acts do not affect the interest of the beneficiary of a
resulting trust. Brandies v. Cochrane, 112 U. S. 344, 5 Sup. Ct. 194 (1884) ; East St. Louis
Lumber Co. v. Schnipper, 310 Ill. 350, 141 N. E. 542 (923) ; School Dist. No. 3o v. Peterson, 74 Minn. 122, 76 N. W. 11 6 (1898) ; Meier v. Kelly, 22 Ore. 136, 29 Pac. 265 (1892)
semble; cf. Lewis v. San Antonio Belt & Term. Ry., 208 S. W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 3919).
Contra: First Nat. Bank of Arcadia v. Savarese, IO Fla. 48o, 134 So. 501 (393) ; Rochester
Trust Co. v. White, 243 Pa. 469, 9o Atl. 127 (394) (statute) ; cf. Parsons v. Robinson, 206
Cal. 378, 274 Pac. 528 (3929) ; First Nat. Bank v. Pounds, 163 Ga. 551, 136 S. E. 528 (1927);
Rosa v. Hummel, 252 Pa. 578, 97 Atl. 942 (1936).
(757)
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argued that since one who purchases from the registered owner gets both legal
and equitable title and is nevertheless unprotected as against subsequent vendees
until his deed is recorded, the cestui of a resulting trust with only equitable title
should certainly be in the same category.6 This is not necessarily true. Interests
in realty arising by operation of law, unlike the ordinary interests created by contractual agreement of the parties to a sale of land, are not required by the Statute
of Frauds7 to be in writing nor is provision made for their recordation.$ Though
the purpose of recording statutes is to give absolute protection to those who rely
in good faith on the record title, where the statute definitively enumerates the
interests that shall be invalid until recorded, the cestui of a resulting trust should
not be precluded from setting up his equitable title which is not covered by the
statute.

BANKS AND BANKING-RIGHT TO PRIORITY OF FUNDS DEPOSITED WITH

divorce action
the husband was ordered to pay $1700 in cash to X as trustee for support of
husband's child, and X was directed by that order to deposit this money in the
defendant bank, of which X was cashier, at the current rate of interest and to
pay certain amounts out of the account twice a year. After several payments,
the defendant bank became insolvent, and the child sought to establish a preference over the general creditors in its assets. Held, that such a preference existed,
since money deposited in a bank which has knowledge that it is trust property is
impressed with a trust. State v. American State Bank, :252 N. W. 460 (Neb.
BANK'S KNOWLEDGE THAT THEY WERE TRUST PROPERTY-In a

1934).

Whether a deposit is general or special depends on the intention of the
parties at the time of making the contract in light of all the surrounding circumstances.1 Knowledge on the part of the bank that money deposited is trust property, if the deposit may properly be made by the trustee or other fiduciary, does2
not make the deposit special, but establishes merely a debtor-creditor relationship.
It is difficult to see what additional expression of intention that the deposit be
special is shown by the fact that the bank knows that the money is deposited by
a trustee under order of court. While this factor has been held sufficient to create
a special deposit,3 it would seem more reasonable that a court by such an order
never intends a bank to keep these bills separate from its general funds, particu6 Principal case at 1014. This would seem to be the proper rule where the terms of the
statute are not sufficient to preclude such a construction. 2 FREEoaAN, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 971, at 2043.

' CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 3o59. The statute specifically provides that interests

arising by operation of law need not be in writing.
' See supra note 4.

'Northern Sugar Corp. v. Thompson, 13 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Fogg v.
Tyler, io9 Me. 7O9, 82 Atl. ioo8 (1912) ; Missouri Mut. Ass'n v. Holland Banking Co., 220
Mo. App. 1256, 29o S. W. ioo (927) ; TRUSTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193O) Tentative
Draft No. I § 15, Comment g.
' Hawkins v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 89 Fed. 266 (C. C. A. 7th, 1898) ; Valentine
v. Duke, 128 Wash. 128, 222 Pac. 494 (1924) (executor) ; Henry v. Martin, 88 Wis. 367, 6o
N. W. 263 (1894) (agent) ; Gray v. Elliott, 36 Wyo. 361, 255 Pac. 593 (0927) (administrator) ; ScOrT, CASES ON TRUSTS (2d ed. 1931) 48 n. I; cf. Smith v. Fuller, 86 Ohio St. 57,

99 N. E. 214 (1912). Knowledge that the money deposited is trust property becomes important only when it is alleged that the bank participated in a breach of trust. MORSE,
BANKs AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 317; Scott, Participationin a Breach of Trust (1921)

34 HARv. L. REv. 454.
3 Matter of Holden, 147 Misc. 209, 264 N. Y. Supp. 244 (933).
posit was made by order of this court creates it as a special deposit ..

"The fact that the de-
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larly when the order requires the bank to pay interest on the deposit; the court
apparently would be satisfied with its chosen bank's promise to repay a like
amount. Also, as in the instant case the court expressly ordered the cashiertrustee, and not the bank, to make the payments to the beneficiary, the deposit
was a mere general deposit and not even for a specific purpose. But even conceding that the effect of the deposit under order of court was to create a general
deposit for a specific purpose,4 the rule that such a deposit establishes the relation
of debtor and creditor and is entitled to no preference on insolvency z is preferred
today on the realistic theory that the depositor intends the bank to use this money
as it sees fit and intends, having faith in the bank, to rely on its promise to apply
a like sum to effect the purpose. To hold that mere knowledge that funds are
trust property, whether deposited under order of court or not, will impress those
funds with a trust in the hands of the bank seems an undue extension of the
"trust fund theory", not only contrary to the intent of the parties, but unduly
hard on the general depositors in such banks.6
BANKS AND BANKING-ULTRA VIRES-RIGHT OF PURCHASER TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF BANK'S CONTRACT TO REPURCHASE BONDS OF A THIRD PARTY

-Plaintiffs purchased first mortgage bonds, which were the obligations of a third
party, from defendant bank under an agreement that bank would repurchase them
at plaintiffs' option at any time after one year, at a stipulated price. After having
repurchased a considerable number of the bonds, bank refused longer to be bound
by the contract. Plaintiffs brought this action for specific performance, alleging
that they had no adequate remedy at law since bank had transferred all of its
assets to its successor for the purpose of liquidation. Held, that plaintiffs could
not enforce the agreement,1 since it was void as being against public policy and
ultra vires. Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 188 N. E. 836 (Ill. 1933).
Of the few decisions where the problem of a bank's liability on a repurchase
agreement has been considered, some of the cases have permitted the purchaser
to recover, either without regard to the question of the bank's corporate power to
enter into such contracts, 2 or on the ground that since the bank had power to sell
the particular paper involved, it could deal with it on whatever terms it desired,
'The court stated that since the bank had to issue certificates of deposit, the bank had
to distribute the fund (principal case at 463). But the court order expressly stated "the
trustee shall pay out of said fund. . .
The Nebraska law is that a general deposit for a specific purpose, though the funds are
to be mingled with the general assets of the bank, is entitled to a priority on insolvency of
the bank, State v. Farmers' State Bank, 121 Neb. 532, 237 N. W. 857 (931) ; State v. State
Bank of Touhy, 122 Neb. 582, 24o N. W. 925 (1932), but that rule would not seem applicable
to these facts, for, as pointed out in the text, here there was properly only a general deposit.
IGreat A. and P. Tea Co. v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 2 F. Supp. 29 (W. D. Pa. 1932) ;
Reichert v. American State Savings Bank, 264 Mich. 366, 249 N. W. 876 (933) ; Com. Nat.
Bank v. Smith, 244 N. W. 521 (S.D. 1932). Contra: Williams v. Bennett, 158 Ga. 488, 123
S. E. 683 (1924) ; Village of Monticello v. Citizens' State Bank, i8o Minn.41S, 23o N. W.
889 (193o); Morton v. Woolery, 48 N. D. 1132, 189 N. W. 232 (1922).
'The great benefit to this plaintiff and the small loss to each general depositor by establishing this preference is perhaps a real, but never articulate, reason for holding such deposits trusts; but with many preferences, the entire assets of an insolvent bank may be dispersed and the general depositors get nothing. The Nebraska court has been traditionally
liberal in finding trusts in insolvent banks and in tracing the res. State v. Farmers' State
Bank of Polk, 121 Neb. 532, 237 N. W. 857 (93).
'The court, however, intimated that plaintiffs might conceivably be entitled to recover
the amount of commissions received by bank as a result of the sale-which was the amount
by which bank profited by the transaction. Principal case at 842.
2
First State Bank of Odessa v. First State Bank of Correll, 172 Minn. 223, 214 N. W.
781 (927) ; Central State Bank of Dallas v. First State Bank, 276 S. W. 941 (Tex. 1925).
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e. g., it could guarantee ultimate payment or agree to repurchase 3 On the other
hand, in those cases where the purchaser was denied recovery,4 greater attention
was paid to underlying considerations of "public policy" framed in the formalistic
language of ultra vires. The Illinois court has in the past been committed to the
conception of a corporation as an artificial entity which can do only those acts
expressly sanctioned by its charter or the statute under which it was formed; all
other acts were considered ultra vires and devoid of legal consequences., But
while purporting to apply the same technique to the instant case, the court in fact
received little aid from its examination of the defendant's charter and the applicable banking statuteY In turning, therefore, to an analysis of the conflicting
interests at stake with a view toward determining whether the contract was
inimical to public welfare-considering the depositor-public's interest as affected
by the threat of a huge contingent liability to the bank's capital, and the latter's
inability to enforce a return of the bonds either to profit by their above-par value
or to check a mounting liability in the face of a falling market 7_-the present
court has taken a first step toward articulate recognition that, where a corporation
has in fact acted, legal consequences cannot be determined merely by perusal of
charter or statutory grant." Resort to "ltra-vires-void" dogma would therefore
seem unnecessary; and, where the bonds represent the bank's own obligation so
that it has received the full amount of the purchase price--as compared with
defendant bank's receipt merely of a commission for the sale of a third party's
obligation 9 -a logical adherence to such a view would result in denying relief to
the purchaser, although the equities are now substantially altered. The consequence is the accretion of fictitious exceptions 1o to the accepted formula in order
to attain a desirable result that can less painfully be reached by the realistic
attitude only partially indicated by the present court.
' Sentney v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 128 Kan. 107, 275 Pac. iosi (1929).
One court, at
least, has made a distinction between a contract guaranteeing payment and an agreement to
repurchase, the latter alone being held enforceable. First Nat. Bank of Franklin v. Schaeffer,
16 Ohio C. C. 457 (1898). But the only difference between these two types of contract for
the purpose here involved would seem to be one of language. In both cases the effect is to
secure the purchaser by a pledge of the bank's credit, although the rule is generally announced
that a bank may not pledge or sell its credit. In cases of guarantee, courts are more likely
to hold the bank's act ultra -ires. 4 MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING (1931) c. 7, § 44.
'Eberlein v. Stockyards Mtge. & Trust Co., 164 Minn. 323, 2o4 N. W. 961 (1925);
Greene v. First Nat. Bank, etc., 172 Minn. 310, 2,5 N. W. 213 (927).
' This attitude does not recognize that corporations in fact frequently do acts
plainly outside of the scope of their chartered prerogative, and that such acts must be considered to be corporate action at least as much as the acts of an individual must be considered
individual action although prohibited by express statute. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine
of Ultra Vires be Discarded? (923) 33 YALE L. J. 49, 51.
1IIL.
REv.STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. I6a, ff I,in no way sheds light on the power of a bank
to make repurchase contracts except insofar as it provides for the doing of a "general banking business".
See Eberlein v. Stockyards Mtge. & Trust Co.; Greene v. First Nat. Bank, etc., both
supra note 4.
'For penetrating analyses of the whole doctrine of ultra vires, see Kefauver, The Doctrinw of Ultra Vires (1927) 6 TENN. L. Rav. 20; Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporations and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 13; Carpenter, supra note 5.
'The difference in the amount by which bank's assets are increased would seem to be the
real basis for the distinction drawn by courts between contracts whereby a bank guarantees
its own obligation and those where it acts as guarantor of the obligation of a third party.
See 4 MICHIE, op. cit. supra note 3, and cases cited therein at L 3, 4 and 5. Cf. Farmers'
& M. Say. Bank v. Crookston State Bank, 169 Minn. 249, 2IO N. W. 998 (1926).
"o
Thus courts which adopt a strict ultra vires theory will frequently make an exception
in those cases where, though the corporation has acted "ultra vires", it has received a benefit
thereby without any corresponding gain to the other party. The argument of the court in
those cases is that the party receiving such benefit is "estopped" to set up the defense of
ultra vires. Chicago Bldg. Soc. v. Crowell, 65 Ill. 453 (1872).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--"DuE PROCESS"-STATUTE MAKING INSURER
UNLAWFULLY FAILING TO PAY CLAIM LIABLE TO DAMAGES AND CLAIMANT'S
ATTORNEY'S FEES-s-By statute ' an insurer who failed to pay a claim under a life

insurance policy within the time specified therein was to be liable to the holder of
the policy, in addition to the loss, for twelve per cent. damages upon the amount
of the loss, plus all reasonable attorney's fees for its prosecution and collection.
It was contended that to invoke this statute against an insurer who had in good
faith and upon reasonable grounds contested a claim under a policy would be a
violation of the "due process" clause.2 Held, that such damages were neither
"arbitrary [n] or oppressive" and might be validly assessed even where contest
is made in good faith. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. McCray, 54
Sup. Ct. 482 (1934).
To discourage insurers from employing dilatory tactics as a bludgeon to
force settlements favorable to themselves 3 in cases where the claimant is ultimately found to have a just claim, several states have imposed counsel fees and
damages upon unsuccessful insurer litigants who either fail to pay a claim2 within
The
the period stipulated in the policy 4 or "vexatiously delay" payment.
Supreme Court has always upheld statutes imposing attorney's fees and damages
upon certain classes to the exclusion of others in the conduct of litigation provided
7
that a diversity of social needs seems to demand such treatment." Insurers and
8
carriers have been held to be classes permitting of special legislative treatment,
and statutes imposing such charges upon them after an unsuccessful contest have
been upheld upon the ground that delay in paying the claimant would work a
greater harm to the individual claimant than assessing the unsuccessful contestant
with the cost of the claimant would wreak upon the contestant. Accordingly, the
only limitation upon such statutes is that they do not preclude resort to the courts I
by the imposition of a "penalty" 10 which goes beyond that which might be reasonable to promote settlement of claims and merely compensate the claimant for his
costs and delay. 1' In the light of the presumption of constitutionality of legisARK.DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 6155.
Amend. XiV.
See 7 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw (I930) § 1866, at 6194.
'ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1828; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 193) § 40256; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §§ 4179, 4246; NEB.CoMP. STAT. (1929) § 44-345, 44-346;
U. S. CoNsT.

TFX.REv. Civ. CODE (Vernon, Supp. 1933) § 4736.
'GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 2549; Mo. STAT. ANN. (I933) § 5929; TENN. ANN.
CODE (1932) § 6434.
'As it was once stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: "It is not enough to invalidate the law
that others may do the same thing and go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact, it is found that
the danger is characteristic of the class named." Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, at
144, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, at 282 (1914).
7
Fidelity Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. 662 (1902) ; Iowa L.
Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 187 U. S. 335, 23 Sup. Ct. 126 (19o2).
'Yazoo & M. Valley R. R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217, 33 Sup. Ct. 40 (1912);
St. Louis, I. & M. Ry. v. Williams, 25, U. S. 63, 40 Sup. Ct. 71 (1919) ; Chicago & N. W.
Ry. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 26o U. S. 35, 43 Sup. Ct. 55 (1922).
' Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441 (19o8) ; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Tucker,
230 U. S. 340, 33 Sup. Ct. 961 (1913) ; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232 U. S. 165, 34
Sup. Ct. 301 (1914). In all these cases the "damages" provided for were held to be so excessive as practically to preclude resort to the courts.
oIt is immaterial whether the charge imposed for delay be termed a "penalty" or "damages". The Court in the principal case stated, at 485: "The measure, not the name controls.
The insurer is not penalized for taking the controversy into court. It is penalized (if penalty
there is) for refusing to make payment in accordance with its contract, and penalized in an
amount that bears a reasonable proportion to the loss or inconvenience likely to be suffered
by the creditor."
"See the following cases in which the statutory "penalty" was upheld as being merely
compensatory: Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73, 28 Sup. Ct. 28 (1907);
Yazoo & M. Valley R. R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., supra note 8.
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lation, the Court in the instant case felt itself unable to say that the penalty here
imposed was so out of proportion to the harm engendered and the evil sought to
be guarded against that it should be set aside.12 While the instant decision seems
entirely justifiable, it is regrettable, in the light of common knowledge of the
many frauds perpetrated upon insurers, that legislatures do not exclude from the
scope of such statutes contests made in good faith.:3 Since insurers can ill afford
to refuse battle to questionable claims at such a risk, they will either pass the
increased cost on to the assured by way of higher premiums, or provide in their
policies that benefits shall not be payable until the insurer has had the opportunity
of litigating the right of the claimant to recover.'"
CORPORATIONS-EQUITABLE SET-OFF-RIGHT OF HOLDING CORPORATION TO
SET OFF SUBSIDIARY'S BANK DEPOSITS AGAINST DEBT OwED BANK BY HOLDING COMPANY-In an action by the receiver of an insolvent bank against a

holding company on its note, the latter attempted to set off the deposit of a subsidiary corporation, all of whose stock was owned by the holding company. The
subsidiary had previously given its note to the bank in exchange for a loan,
making certain promises with respect to the maintenance of deposits,' and the
holding company's note was given in exchange for a discharge of the subsidiary's
note, the subsidiary at that time giving its notes to the holding company and
reiterating its promises to the bank with respect to the maintenance of deposits.
Held, that because the transaction as a whole clearly implied an understanding
that the bank should have the right to set off the subsidiary's deposits against the
holding company's note, there was mutuality of obligation to justify a set-off by
the holding company. Piedmont Print Works, Inc. v. Receivers of People's State
Bank, 68 F. (2d) i1O (C. C. A. 4 th, 1934).
By resting its decision on the "implied understanding", the court avoided the
much more disputable question whether, in the absence of such understanding, a
set-off could have been allowed. Where a debtor is a holding company or an
individual owner of all the shares in a corporation, the courts have refused to
allow the former to set off deposits of the latter on the ground that they are
separate entities, so that the claims of the bank and of the depositor are not
mutual claims.2 In the instant case, however, in which the holding company gave
Principal case at 484. The Court stated, at 486, that it would uphold penalties which
were no more than the fair price of the adventure of testing their right in a court action.
See also the remarks of the Court quoted supra note IO.
"' Supra note 5.

If the statute were one imposing a penalty only where the contest was in bad faith, it
is unlikely that by inserting such a provision the insurer could escape the statutory penalty
where the contest was in fact conducted in bad faith.
1

:'The subsidiary had borrowed $IO0,OOO from the plaintiff bank and $I75,ooo from another bank at the same time, and promised to maintain balances in each bank in the ratio of
175 to 100. It seems quite obvious that the intent was that the deposits should be in the
nature of collateral to secure the loan, thus giving the banks the right to set them off against
the debts.
2 Mente & Co. v. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co., 176 La. 476, 146 So. 28 (1933);
Thresher v. Simpson, 223 Mass. 349, in N. E. 1035 (1916) ; Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 54 N. W. 1115 (1893) ; State v. Weston Bank, 251 N. W. 164 (Neb.
1933).

Contra: Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 623, 221 Pac. 856 (1923).

The

majority decisions are consistent with the general view that the courts will not usually set
aside the "corporate entity" merely because one person or a holding company owns all the
shares of a corporation, or merely because two corporations have the same shareholders and
officers, unless it becomes necessary to do so in order to avoid fraud and injustice. Majestic
Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, 21 F. (2d) 72o (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry.,
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its note to the bank solely to provide its subsidiary with capital, and the latter, in
turn, gave its note for the same amount to the holding company, it would seem
that the subsidiary which received the benefit of the loan, and which would ultimately have to pay it off, is the real borrower, while the holding company is3
simply an accommodation debtor, so that the claims involved were truly mutual.
The technical obstacle to reaching this result is that the bank could not maintain
any action against the subsidiary whose deposit the debtor attempted to set off.
However, the possibility of maintaining cross-actions between parties should not
always be the test of mutuality for the purpose of set-off. In fact, in another
situation, the courts have refused an accommodation borrower the right to set off
his own deposit, thus disregarding the existing possibility of cross-actions and
emphasizing the fact that the borrower was not ultimately liable. 4 In still another
group of cases, they have emphasized the fact that the loan in question had been
incurred for the benefit of the person whose deposit the immediate debtor
attempted to set off, holding that the beneficiary of the transaction was in fact
obligated to the lender.5 It requires but a short step from these holdings to
formulate a rule that where money has been borrowed solely for the use of
another person or corporation who has actually used it, and has become obligated
for it to the borrower, borrower and beneficiary should be regarded as one person
for the purpose of allowing a set-off.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-POWER OF THE FEDERAL TRADE ComiIsSION TO ORDER A CORPORATION TO DivEST ITSELF OF PHYSICAL PROPERTY AND
ASSETS OBTAINED THROUGH UNLAWFUL INTERCORPORATE SHAREHOLDINC-

The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against a holding company
which had, in violation of the Clayton Act,1 acquired the controlling shares of
217 App. Div. 504, 217 N. Y. Supp. i56 (1926), rev'd, 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926) ;
Nashville Ry. v. Faris, 6o S. W. (2d) 425 (Tenn. 1933). Most of these cases, however, involve the question whether a holding corporation may be held responsible for the tort or contractual act of its subsidiary, and whether they may maintain actions inter se, and so are of
little aid to the solution of a case involving the question of set-off.
' This result would be reached even if the two corporations be considered as separate
entities, and if the holding company did not hold a single share of stock in the subsidiary.
If, however, the subsidiary were not obligated to the holding company for the amount of the
loan, such a result could not be reached. But where a sole shareholder borrows for the benefit of his corporation, the mere fact that there is no evidence of a note or express promise
given him by the corporation should not preclude this result. It is highly improbable that a
sole shareholder should observe the empty formality of procuring a note or promise from
himself as director of the corporation (or from his "straw" directors) to himself as shareholder, and it is equally improbable that he should intend to make a gift to the corporation.
Therefore, it might reasonably be inferred that the corporation is nevertheless obligated to
him.
'The courts emphasize the fact that he can indemnify himself by an action against the
primary borrower. Consistently, where the accommodation borrower can show that the
primary borrower is insolvent, the courts allow the set-off. Spurway v. Weintraub, 66 F.
(2d) 69 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Borough Bank v. Mulqueen, 70 Misc. 137, 125 N. Y. Supp.
1034 (i9io); Knaffle v. Knoxville Banking & Trust Co., 128 Tenn. i8i, 159 S. W. 838
(1913).
'Kendrick

State Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 2o6 Fed. 94o (D. Ore. 1913);

Keyes v. First Nat. Bank, 25 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; see Holman v. Commercial
& Savings Bank, 50 S. D. 524, 21o N. W. 73o (1926). Contra: Cantley v. Finney, 51 S. W.
(2d) i47 (Mo. App. 1932).
138 STAT. 730 (914),

I5

U. S. C. A. §§

12-27 (1927).
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stock of two competing corporations. 2 Pending the outcome of this proceeding,
the holding company created a new corporation by the merger of the competing
corporations, and was then voluntarily dissolved. The Commission, purporting
to act under authority of Section i i of the Clayton Act,- thereupon ordered the
new corporation to divest itself of the assets of one or the other of the competing
corporations. Held (four justices dissenting 4), that Section ii of the statute
limits the Commission's power to an order requiring the offending corporation to
divest itself of only the shares of stock of the competing corporations, and does
not authorize an order compelling a divestiture of assets. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FederalTrade Commission, 54 Sup. Ct. 532 (1934).
The Supreme Court has held, on a previous occasion, that the Commission
may properly order a corporation, which holds shares of stock in violation of
Section 7 " of the Clayton Act, to divest itself of the shares in such manner as
to preclude it from acquiring, directly or indirectly, the assets of the competing
corporation.6 But where the illegally obtained shares had already been used to
acquire the physical plant and property of a competing corporation before the
Commission had acted, the Court held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction
to order a divestiture of the plant and property." Midway between these situations lies the situation presented by the instant case. 8 All of these cases turn
upon a construction of Section ii, which seemingly was intended to apply to not
only presently existing violations of Section 7, but to past violations as well. 9
Therefore, it would seem that, at least apart from considerations other than
statutory construction, the majority of the Court was not justified in restricting
the jurisdiction of the Commission to such narrow confines as to render it powerless to act if the offending corporation, by means of its unlawfully acquired stock,
has succeeded in effecting a merger before the Commission has had an opportunity to issue an order; 1 ° and this, even though the Commission had entered its
complaint before the merger was an accomplished fact. Furthermore, the instant
decision has the effect of placing a premium upon haste, since upon the filing of
a complaint by the Commission, a race would at once ensue between it and the
offending corporation, each seeking to be the first to attain its respective objec- Section 7 of the Clayton Act is in part as follows: "No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of two or more
corporations engaged in commerce where the effect of such acquisition, or the use of such
stock by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen com.petition between such corporations
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"Whenever the commission . . . shall have reason to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of the provisions of said sections, it shall issue and serve upon such
person a complaint stating its charges. . . . If upon such hearing the commission . . .
shall be of the opinion that any of the provisions of said sections have been or are being violated, .

.

. it shall issue . . . an order requiring such person to cease and desist from
. . ." (italics added). 38 STAT. 734

such violations, and divest itself of the stock held
(I914), 43 STAT. 939 (925),

15 U. S. C. A. §21 (1927).

'Hughes, C. J., Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, JJ.
' Supra note 2.
'Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 175 (1926).
'Thatcher Manufacturing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 272 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct.
175 (1926) ; Swift & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, ibid.
' It is interesting to note that in the dissenting opinion in the Thatcher and Swift cases,
supranote 7, Mr. Justice Brandeis raised the facts of the principal case as a hypothetical case
and assumed that in such a situation the Commission could require a retransfer of assets.
' Supra note 3. Note especially the words italicized.
"Note (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 463, 465. See also the dissenting opinion in the
Thatcher and Swift cases, supra note 7. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat
Co., supra note 6.
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tive.3' The Clayton Act being remedial, and not penal, in nature, the jurisdiction
of the Commission should not be defeated by an abnormally strict interpretation
of its provisions. 1 2 And especially should this be so, where, as in the instant case,
was intended merely as an artifice to evade the prohibitions of
the merger
3
the Act.1

INSURANCE-GRouP INSURANCE-EFFECT OF PROVISION REQUIRING TOTAL
DISABILITY FOR SIX MONTHS WHERE TERm INSURANCE POLICY EXPIRES
BEFORE END OF THE SIX MONTHS-Defendant insured X's employees under a

four-year group policy.' An insuring clause provided: "If an employee . . .
shall furnish . . . due proof that . . . he . . . has become totally and permanently disabled . . . and that he . . . has been so . . . disabled for
. . . six months, the company will immediately pay . . . the amount of insur-

ance [then] in force hereunder on such insured .... " - Plaintiff became so
disabled four months before the expiration of the policy term, and duly filed his
proof of loss six months later. Held, that the "clear and unambiguous" policy provisions precluded his recovery, since there was no insurance "in force" after the
end of the four-year term. Kingsland v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 66 S. W.
(2d) 959 (Mo. App. 1934).
It is a settled principle of construction that, where an insurance contract is2
ambiguous, the insured is entitled to the interpretation most favorable to him.
While the court in the instant case intimated that it would prefer to hold otherwise,3 it found that the words "in force" referred unequivocally to the duration
of the policy term. There would seem equal justification, as a matter of construction, for regarding the contingent liability as remaining "in force" despite
the expiration of the policy term. 4 And it is at least as likely that the words
referred merely to the antount of insurance "in force" upon the particular em-

' The

corporation enjoys a decided advantage over the Commission, which cannot act until the former has acquired the shares of stock, which acquisition is the first notice which the
public has of the corporation's scheme. By formulating the merger plans before the acquisition of the stock, the merger may usually be effected before the Commission has had an opportunity to conduct a hearing and report its findings as required by Section ii of the Act.
2 The purpose of the statute was stated very succinctly by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his
dissenting opinion in the Thatcher and Swift cases, supra note 7, at 563, 47 Sup. Ct. at 179.
It is well worth. repeating: "In my opinion, the purpose of section 7 of the Clayton Act was
not, as stated by the Court, merely 'to prevent continued holding of the stock and the peculiar
evils incident thereto'. It was also to prevent the peculiar evils resulting therefrom."
13It would certainly seem more in keeping with the obvious purpose of the act to permit
the Commission, when it has filed its complaint while the shares are illegally held, to retain
jurisdiction at least until it has had an opportunity to make its findings and order.
'Instant case at 960. (Italics added.)
21 CoucHr, INsURANcE (1929) § 188. "Since indemnity is the ultimate object of insurance, the construction should be in favor thereof . . ." id. § i88a. Further, technical defenses by the insurer are frowned upon by the courts. 8 id. § 2168 and cases therein cited.
I "If the clause be plain and unequivocal in its terms, it must stand and must prevail
despite any inclination of the court to relieve an unfortunate situation." Instant case at 961.
Compare the more familiar case of an automobile indemnity policy, in which the insurer frequently postpones payment until an adverse judgment has been obtained against the
insured. If an accident occurs during the policy term, the insurer's contingent liability remains "in force" even though such judgment may not be rendered until long after the policy
term has expired. This liability is contingent in the sense that it is subject to conditions subsequent, e. g., seasonable filing of proof of loss; cooperation with the insurer. See infra
note 8. For an interesting example of the extent to which courts will go in holding that a
group policy remains "in force", see Dale v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 19 Dist. & C. 293 (Pa.
1933).
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ployee, since this amount frequently varies during the life of the group policy.5
While the reason for the insertion of the six months' waiting period is not stated
in the policy, it is questionable whether the defendant's actuaries fixed a lower
premium in contemplation of nonliability on the facts presented by the instant
case. It is more probable that this provision was inserted to prevent fraudulent
claims and to make certain that a disability would in fact be permanent and total.
Therefore, since compensation for disability is apparently based upon the fact or
existence of the disability,6 it is submitted that the six months' provision should be
interpreted merely as requiring a certain mode of proving that fact rather than as
a condition precedent to liability.7

The decision reached in the instant case would

seem to require an employer who would fully protect his employees under such
contracts to carry overlapping policies during the last six months of any term.8
Moreover, a strict application of this holding would allow the insurer to evade
responsibility either by cancelling the group policy after a number of "unmatured"
disabilities have occurred,9 or by collusion with the employer to discharge disabled
employees.10
'L e., many group policies provide that the insurance on an employee shall increase with
each continued year of employment. It is probable, therefore, that this portion of the insuring clause, when construed in conjunction with other provisions in the policy, referred to insurance in force upon one employee as distinguished from amounts in force on other employees.
'For, where the insurer attempts to cancel the policy after the insured has become disabled, the cancellation is held ineffective to discharge his liability. Jones v. Commercial etc.
Ass'n of America, 114 N. Y. Supp. 589 (igo8), aff'd, 134 App. Div. 936, 118 N. Y. Supp.
1116 (i9o9), modified, 2Ol N. Y. 576, 93 N. E. 113o (1911) ; O'Neil v. American Assurance
Co., 52 Pa. Super. 577 (1913). The same rule applies to fire policies. Adamson Mfg. Co.
v. Fireman's etc. Co., 257 Ill. App. 443 (1930).
' Reported cases do not appear to have decided this question. A provision that the policy
shall be void if the insured fails to furnish proof of loss within a certain time is upheld.
Sometimes its validity is predicated upon breach of a condition precedent. Meech v. National
Acc. Soc., 5o App. Div. 144, 63 N. Y. Supp. ioog (19oo) ; Blackman v. United States Casualty Co., 117 Tenn. 578, 103 S. W. 784 (19o7). The better view seems to be that it is a
breach of a condition subsequent. Whalen v. Equitable Acc. Co., 99 Me. 231, 58 AtI. 1057
(19o4); Martin v. Equitable Acc. Ass'n, 61 Hun 467, 16 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1891). However,
it was not material to the decision of any of the above cases which terminology was employed. And, if the policy does not expressly provide for forfeiture for failure to furnish
proofs within the specified time, the only effect of delay is to postpone the insurer's liability.
St. Paul etc. Ins. Co. v. Owens, 69 Kan. 6o2, 77 Pac. 544 (19o4) ; see cases collected in Note
1915F L. R. A. 2Io. By analogy, it is submitted that the six months' provision in the instant
case should not be considered a condition precedent.
' The court stressed the fact that the policy had been terminated by the act of the employer. It is interesting to note that, unless the policy contained a renewal clause by which
the purchase of a new policy would be tantamount to a continuation of the term of the old
contract, nothing that the employer could do, at the expiration of the four-year term, would
have aided this plaintiff: his disability would not have occurred while either the old or the
new policy was "in force".
' Group policies generally reserve to the insurer the right to cancel, either with or without notice to the individual employees. See Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 1461, 147o; 6 Coucr,
INSURANCE (1930) §§ 1404, 1406. Such cancellation discharges unmatured liabilities. Davern
v. Travelers' Eq. Ins. Co., 172 Minn. 19, 214 N. W. 468 (1927) (cancellation of personal
health policy after insured became ill but before he became disabled; recovery for disability
denied) ; Baker v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 2o2 N. C. 432, 163 S. E. 1io (1932) (cancellation after
employee became disabled; recovery denied widow for death benefits). However, cancellation of a policy providing for disability benefits, after the insured has been disabled, will not
generally relieve the insurer from liability for disability benefits. See cases cited supra
note 6.
"7Cessation of employment terminates the group policy as to such employee. Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Fox, 155 Md. 2IO, 141 AtI. 547 (1928) ; Chrosniak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
121 Misc. 453, 201 N. Y. Supp. 2II (1923) ; RICHARDS, INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) § 384; see
Note (933) 85 A. L. R. 1461, 1467.
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-RIGIIT OF NONRESIDENT SUBJECT TO STATUTORY SERVICE OF PROCESS TO BENEFIT OF TiHE STATUTE

OF LiMITATIONS-The Wisconsin six-year statute of limitations on tort claims "
contained the usual exception suspending the running of the statute as to nonresidents and those absenting themselves from the jurisdiction. 2 Wisconsin also
had a statute subjecting nonresidents using the state's roads to service of process
through the Secretary of State.3 Plaintiff, a Wisconsin resident, whose auto had
been damaged by the negligent driving in Wisconsin of J, a nonresident, brought
an action against J for the damages sustained, serving process through the Secretary of State more than six years after the claim arose. Held, that the fact that
the defendant could have been served at any time during the statutory period did
not entitle him to claim the benefit of the statute of limitations. Bode v. Flynn,
252 N. W. 284 (Wis. 1934).
Most statutes of limitations contain a clause suspending the operation of the
statute if a person is out of the jurisdiction when a cause of action accrues against
him, or if he goes out after it accrues. 4 The primary purpose of the clause is to
safeguard the rights of plaintiffs against defendants who might seek to wipe out
claims by going or remaining beyond the jurisdiction for the statutory period.
The instant case is apparently the first to present the question of the relationship
between this clause and the recently conceived statutes authorizing service on
nonresidents through the Secretary of State for torts committed in using a state's
roads. 5 In an earlier case presenting an analogous problem, a foreign corporation,
which had withdrawn from Wisconsin but remained subject to service of process
because of a statutory provision, was denied the right to claim the benefit of the
statute of limitations. 6 The court admitted that the corporation ought to be
considered a resident and entitled to the statute's benefits, but it felt bound to
apply the statutes involved strictly.7 In the instant case the court relied strongly

on the earlier decision and did little but reiterate its reasoning." While the result
reached is perhaps justifiable on strict principles of statutory construction,9 the
decision entirely ignores the purposes of the statute of limitations and the sus'WIs. STAT. (1931)
3- Id. at § 330.30.
Id. at § 85.05.

§330.19.

'The clause is founded on the English Statute of 4 & 5 ANN- c. 3, § 19 (1703), suspending the operation of the Statute of Limitations when the defendant is absent beyond the
seas.

I Declared constitutional in Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (927),
-nx
LAW
this statute has been adopted in many jurisdictions. See 15-16 HUDDY, AuTomo
(9th ed. 1931) § 82.
o State v. National Accident Society of N. Y., 103 Wis. 208, 79 N. W. 220 (1899).
ISome reliance was also placed on an amendment to the suspending clause making a
special exception in favor of foreign corporations maintaining a manufacturing plant in Wisconsin, the court applying the familiar doctrine that the making of the one exception indicated an intention on the part of the legislature to exclude all other exceptions. This reason
was also applied in the instant case, but it would seem that a great deal of its force is lost
when, as in the instant case, the problem is not one involving corporations at all.
I A further reason presented for the result reached (principal case at 487) was that the
defendant evaded action by the plaintiff by absenting himself from the jurisdiction, and that
he also failed to seek the plaintiff at his residence and settle with him for his damages, citing
Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S. 72 (x876), which involved a simple debt. It is
submitted that a tort claim imposes no such obligation on the tortfeasor to seek out the injured party and that defendant, by absenting himself from Wisconsin, did not evade prosecution by the plaintiff, since the latter could have resorted to the service of process statute.
I Quite obviously the limitation statutes, when passed, did not contemplate the development of the automobile service of process statute and hence did not consider exceptions in
favor of nonresidents who might be subject to service of process. Of course, the court might
well have regarded defendant as not being beyond the "jurisdiction" for the purpose of service.
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pending clause. The time for the bringing of actions is limited in order to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims at a time when evidence may
have been lost or human memory weakened. The statute is one of repose intended to run against those neglectful of their rights.1 0 The suspending clause
exists because ordinarily, while the defendant is beyond the jurisdiction, it cannot
be said that the plaintiff has neglected his rights. But when, as here, defendants
beyond the jurisdiction can be served with process, to impose on them, as the
price of committing a tort while using the highways of another state, a liability
unlimited as to time, seems wholly unwarranted."
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-UNITED STATES-CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED
STATES-RIGHT OF SET-OFF IN AN ACTION INSTITUTED BY THE UNITED STATES

-Plaintiff, the United States, instituted foreclosure proceedings under a mortgage given as security for a loan by the Federal Farm Board, an unincorporated
governmental agency, to the defendant, a cooperative wheat marketing organization. Although default was admitted, the foreclosure was resisted upon the
theory that the defendant was entitled to set off a debt which resulted from the
sale of the defendant's wheat to the Stabilization Corporation, a privately owned
governmental agency. It was contended that this transaction, undertaken at the
order of the Farm Board, amounted to a sale of the wheat to the United States.
Held, that assuming the sale to have been to the United States, nevertheless the
debt arising therefrom could not be set off against the government because the
defendant had failed to submit the claim, prior to suit, to the proper federal
accounting official, as required by statute.' North Dakota-Montana Wheat
Growers' Ass'n v. United States, 66 F. (2d) 573 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
The right to plead set-off or counterclaim against a sovereign was apparently
denied under early English decisions. 2 Subequently, however, cross-bills of discovery were sanctioned in suits instituted by foreign sovereigns in English
courts;3 but it was not until 188o that the plea of counterclaim was allowed as
an exception to the general immunity of a sovereign from suits.4 A tendency
soon developed to restrict the use of the counterclaim to situations where it arose
from the same transaction as the one upon which the sovereign sued.5 In the
United States, the Act of 1797' was construed to permit set-off and counterclaim 7 providing the claim had been submitted, prior to suit, to the proper
accounting official for allowance. Under the statute no distinction has been made
as to the source of the counterclaim,- as has been done in the English cases,9 nor
See I WOOD, LIMITATION OF AcMONS (4th ed. 1916) §§ 4, 5.
' Defendant urged strongly that the statute of limitations was a privilege which could
10

not be constitutionally abrogated, but the court dismissed his argument on the ground that the
statute of limitations is not a fundamental privilege within the meaning of the Constitution.
I STAT. 515 (797), 28 U. S. C. A. §774 (1927).
See cases cited in II ENG. & Em1p. DIG. 530 (1922)

§ 339, and note thereto.

'Rothschild v. Queen of Portugal, 3 Y. & C. Ex. C. 594 (1839) ; United States v. Prioleau, 14 L. T. R. (N. s.) 700 (1866).
'Strousberg v. Republic of Costa Rica, 44 L. T. R. (N. s.) igg (188o).
Queen v. Scott, ii N. Z. L. R. 638
6 Queen v. Whitehead, I Ex. R. Can. 134 (1884);
(1892); Queen v. Montreal Woolen Mills Co., 4 Ex. R. Can. 348 (895); South African
Republic v. La Compagnie etc., [1898] I Ch. D. 19o; Union of Soviet Republics v. Belaiew,
42 T. L. R. :21 (I925).
6Supra note i. For general treatment of the problems of set-off in suits by the state or
federal government, see Notes (1926) 42 A. L. R. 1464, 1480; (911) 33 L. R. A. (N. s.)
376.
'See United States v. Prentice, 6 McLean 65, 67 (C. C. Ill. 1853).
' See United States v. Wilkins, 19 U. S. 135, 144 (1821) ; United States v. Buchanan, 49

U. S. 83, 105 (1850) ; Watkins v. United States, 76 U. S. 759, 765 (1869).
SSupra note 5.
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does the statute authorize a monetary recovery against the United States, 0 again
contrary to the English view. 11 Despite the obvious equities existing in favor
of the defendant in the principal case, the oversight in not having submitted the
claim to the proper accounting official 12 barred the assertion of the set-off. Had
the claim been submitted, the court would have been faced with the nice problem
of deciding whether the transaction had resulted in a sale to the United States.3
But it is doubtful if an opposite decision would have been reached; for the
Stabilization Corporation, although clearly a governmental agency,'" is owned
by private shareholders, and would probably be regarded as an entity distinct
from the government. 15 It seems indeed unfortunate that the Agricultural Marketing Act, so evidently aimed to aid the farmer, should be frustrated by the
technicalities of legal principle and precedent.
ESTATE-CONFLICTING
TAXES-DRRANCE'S
TAXATION-INHERITANCE
ADJUDICATIONS OF DOMICIL AS A DENIAL OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-Dr.

John T. Dorrance died in 193o with residences in both New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Both states assessed inheritance taxes, amounting to about $i7,oooooo

each, on his intangible personalty, each claiming that he was domiciled within its
borders. An appeal from the Pennsylvania tax was upheld by the Supreme Court
of that state.' Certiorariwas denied by the United States Supreme Court on the
ground that no federal question was involved ;2 the Pennsylvania tax was accordingly paid. The instant action was an appeal from the New Jersey assessment,
alleging that the adjudication by the Pennsylvania court was final as to the
question of domicil. Held, that the Pennsylvania court was without jurisdiction
in this matter since Dr. Dorrance was domiciled in New Jersey, and that therefore
full faith and credit need not be given to the decree and the New Jersey tax was
2o6

United States v. Eckford, 73 U. S. 484 (1867) ; United States v. Nipissing Mines Co.,
Fed. 431 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913), certioraridenied, 234 U. S. 765, 34 Sup. Ct. 673 (1914).

Somewhat curiously, this is not the law when the United States institutes a suit in admiralty.
There it is held the defendant may cross-libel and recover a monetary judgment against the
United States. United States v. Norwegian Barque "Thekla", 266 U. S. 328, 45 Sup. Ct. 112
Contra: Bowker v. United States, 1O5 Fed. 398 (D. N. J. I9OO), aff'd, 186 U. S.
(1924).
135, 22 Sup. Ct. 802 (1902).

IAppu v. The Queen's Advocate, 53 L. J. P. C. 72 (1884).
'In United States v. McCarl, 275 U. S. I, 48 Sup. Ct. 12 (927), it was held that the
Comptroller General cannot be mandamused to consider claims against the United States
Emergency Fleet Corporation, even though it is a government-owned corporation. In the
principal case, at 578, the court suggested that the claim should have been submitted to the
Federal Farm Board, or to the officers of the Stabilization Corporation. See Schnell and
Wettach, Corporationsas Agencies of the Recovery Progrant (1934) 12 N. C. L. REV. 77-80.
'Because the alleged set-off was for more than $io,ooo, the problem would be further
complicated by procedural difficulties. Granting the existence of a valid claim against the
United States, it has been suggested that the proper procedure would be a stay of proceedings, pending the prosecution of a suit by the defendants in the Court of Claims. (934) 34
CoL. L. REv. 375.
A Board of Trade v. Wallace, 67 F. (2d) 402, 408 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
In Schnell and Wettach, supra note 12, at 95, the conclusion is reached that the entity
of governmentally controlled private corporations will be disregarded only insofar as necessary to protect the interests of the United States. See Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Emergency
Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386 (1922) ; United States Shipping Board etc. v.
Harwood, 281 U. S. 519, 50 Sup. Ct. 372 (193o). But cf. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S.
491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165 (1921) ; United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S. 1O6, 43 Sup.
Ct. 283 (1923) ; Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union, 275 U. S. 415, 48 Sup. Ct. 198
(1928). For a detailed and comprehensive treatment of this angle of the principal case, see
(1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 374.
Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932).
Sub non Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 287 U. S. 66o, 53 Sup. Ct. 222 (1932).

2'Dorrance's
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In re Dorrance's Estate. 17o Atl. 6oi (N. J. Prerogative

Ct. 1934).

Since the rule is settled that full faith and credit need be given only where the
judgment offered as binding was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, 4 it was within the province of the New Jersey court to examine the facts
upon which jurisdiction in Pennsylvania was assumed. In conjunction with the
finding that Dr. Dorrance was not domiciled in Pennsylvania, he was found to
be domiciled in New Jersey, so that the New Jersey tax becomes proper on the
principle that intangible personalty is taxable at the domicil.5 While stating
practically the same principles of Conflict of Laws and many of the same authorities,6 but emphasizing different facts,7 the two courts found the decedent domiciled
in their respective states. The New Jersey Court of Appeals and Errors will
undoubtedly affirm, and an appeal to the United States Supreme Court is almost
certain to follow. A denial of certiorariis improbable since there will bei the
problem of full faith and credit and another very likely argument in double
taxation as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The alternative courses which appear to be open to the Court may
be listed as follows: (i) It may hold that the New Jersey court is required to
give full faith and credit to the Pennsylvania decree-a result which would be
an absolute change in the interpretation hitherto made of that constitutional
clause 8 and therefore unlikely. (2) The decision may be that though the question
of domicil is solely for the forum state to decide, a second assessment would
constitute a violation of due process, and is therefore not permissible. Such a
decision would encourage a race among states for inheritance taxes, so that the
one first collecting would be secure-again an improbable solution. (3) Another
possibility is a finding, as in the last suggestion, that the matter of domicil is solely
for the forun state and that the resulting double taxation is not a deprivation
without due process. Though the situations where the Court has held against
"double taxation" are in some degree distinguishable,' the facts are not so radis The state also sought to establish an estoppel on the executors since the deceased's will
had been probated in New Jersey, allowances for services had been made to them in the New
Jersey courts and affidavits had been made that the decedent was domiciled in New Jersey.
However, the court refused to consider these arguments and dealt with the main issues-a
course of action which is to be highly commended.
' Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 20 Sup. Ct. 446 (19oo) ; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S.
43, 28 Sup. Ct. I (19o7) ; Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U. S. 162, 34 Sup. Ct. 299 (1914).
'Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (193o) ; First
Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1932).
6 Dickinson v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 181 Mass. 195, 63 N. E. 331 (1902) ; Williamson
v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442 (94), and various sections in the following works

of which the most recent editions are cited: CONFLICT OF LAWs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst.
193o) Proposed Final Draft No. i; DicEY, CoNmcr OF LAws (5th ed. 1932) ; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws (8th ed. 1883).
Pennsylvania, for example, emphasizes the relatively greater amount of time spent, the
cost of maintenance and greater comforts of the Pennsylvania residence. The New Jersey
court stresses the various utterances of the decedent as important evidence of his intention.
It also implies that Dr. Dorrance was forced by the social desires of his wife and family to
acquire a Pennsylvania home, but that deep in his heart he always meant to come back to the
old homestead in New Jersey. On the other hand the Pennsylvania court pictures the doctor
to avoid taxation but really intending to reside in Pennsylvania.
as scheming
8
Supra note 4. See also Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause (1933) 81 U. OF
PA. L. REy. 371.

9
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 6o3 (1925) (tangible personalty may
be taxed only at sitim) ; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59
(1929) (intangibles not taxable at domicil of equitable owner, since taxed at domicil of
holder of legal title) ; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (193o) (bank deposits taxable only at domicil of decedent) ; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282
U. S. I, 5, Sup. Ct. 54 (1930) (unsecured debts taxable only at domicil of decedent creditor,
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cally different as to suggest a departure here from its customary disapproval. A
further obstacle is the rule of taxation at domicil only, and an unwavering
principle that a man may have but one domicil at any one time.'0 (4) Still another
course for the Court to take would be to decide that in a case as here presented,
where the denial of full faith and credit is based on a question of domicil, it would
review the facts establishing domicil. This is a function which the Supreme
Court has successfully avoided in the past.:' But even if now assumed, it would
prove helpful only if there were a finding in favor of domicil in Pennsylvania.
Should the finding be of a New Jersey domicil, the double taxation problem would
crop up again, as the executors would be without a remedy to recover the tax
paid Pennsylvania.12 Which of these solutions the Court will adopt is very
problematical,
but the ultimate decision will certainly prove a landmark in the
3
law.'
TORTS-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER OF DANGEROUS ARTICLES TO PER-

SONS NOT IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT-DEFEcTS WHIcH MAKE A, CHATTEL
"DANGEROUS"-Plaintiff, an employee of a motortruck owner, sued manufacturer of truck for injuries sustained when allegedly defective door handle gave
way, causing the door to open suddenly and plaintiff to be thrown through the
door and fall under the truck. Held (one justice dissenting), that the alleged
defect was not one which made a truck "a thing of danger", and therefore no
cause of action was stated. Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck, Corp., 268 N. Y.

Supp. 545 (App. Div. 1934).
In MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co.,' the New York Court of Appeals held,
and the ruling has received wide support from the courts 2 and legal writers,3 that
a manufacturer of a chattel owes the affirmative obligation to employ reasonable
not at domicil of debtor) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 5 (public
securities not taxable by any state other than domicil) ; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine,
supra note 5 (state of incoporation could not tax shares of stock left by decedent domiciled
in another state).
" CONFLICr OF LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. i93o) Proposed Final Draft No. i
§ 13; GooDRIcir, CoFLucr OF LAws (1927) § 14.
In an excellent comment on the Dorrance decision in Pennsylvania, Note (1932) 8i U.
OF PA. L. REv. 177, the suggestion is made in favor of this type of finding, on the grounds
that the rare cases, in which two state supreme courts will find the same individual domiciled
within their borders, usually involve a case of attempted evasion of a higher tax and should
not be given much sympathy, and that the Supreme Court is not absolutely declared against
double taxation. The writer, however, fails to dispose of, though he does mention, the
two fundamental rules that inheritance taxes on intangibles are assessed only at the domicil,
and that a man can have but one domicil at any one time.
u Cf. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct. 152 (1917) ; Tilt v. Kelsey, supra note 4.
'a The decision by the state supreme court would conclude action in the state courts, while
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids action in the federal
courts.
' Some procedure whereby the states could be joined in an action involving a controversy
like the present one might seem a possible remedy. But objections such as overcrowding the
Supreme Court dockets and the fact that the controversy is not really between the states to
bring it within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seem to be substantial bars.
See Note (1932) 81 U. oF PA. L. REV. 177.
1217 N. Y. 382, I1 N. E. 1O5O (igi6).
IGoullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 6th, 193o) ; Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 24o N. W. 392 (1932).
3
TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 193o) Tentative Draft No. 5 § 265, COMMENTARIES
ON ToRTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 265; BURDIcK, TORTS (1926)1544; H PER,
TORTS (I933) 246; Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Imninediate Vendees (929) 45 L. Q. REV. 343, 353.
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care in the manufacture of chattels which, while not necessarily dangerous if
properly constructed, constitute a serious menace to life and limb if not carefully
made. This duty is owed to anyone likely to be harmed by the defective article
when put to its ordinary use. The efforts of the courts to give effect to this
doctrine have brought peculiar results in varying factual situations. In using the
test of liability favored by the court in the MacPhwrson case,4 "not merely possible, but probable danger", the courts have held that such things as the heel of
a shoe,5 a mattress,' a valve handle,7 a packing carton,' or a bed,' are not things
which if defectively made subject the manufacturer to liability to third persons
injured as a result of such defect. An elevator cable,'" a hoisting chain,11 a sanitary napkin, 12 a bottle filled with seltzer water,'3 and a doughnut making machine, 14 when defective, have been held to be things of danger. Certain defective
parts of an automobile or tractor have been held to make it a dangerous chattel
and liability has been imposed on the manufacturer for the negligent use of
defective parts in his product.' 5 No chattel is in itself dangerous,", but becomes
"a thing of danger" when certain parts are defective. Defects in certain parts
are more likely to make any chattel "a thing of danger" than defects in other
parts, and the manufacturer is protected by the application of the rules that the
care exercised must be commensurate with the expectable danger,' and that the
defect must be the "proximate cause" of the injury. In a factual situation similar
to that presented by the principal case, a Maryland court allowed recovery against
the lessor of an automobile.' An equal amount of responsibility should be placed
upon the manufacturer who was the creator of the defective chattel. The courts
have, however, drawn a feeble line of distinction between defects which make a
threat of injury from the chattel merely trifling, or serious and therefore "a thing
of danger". This method has had the effect of giving the defendant manufacturer
exemption in doubtful cases, and it seems proper that borderline cases such as
the principal case should be submitted to the jury for their determination.
ISupra note i, at 389, 111 N. E. at 1053.

v. Garside & Sons, Inc., 145 Misc. 577, 259 N. Y. Supp. 947 (i932).
Jaroniec v Hasselbarth, Inc., 223 App. Div. 382, 228 N. Y. Supp. 302 (1928).
'Byers v. Flushovalve Co., 16o N. Y. Supp. 1050 (Sup. Ct. 1916). Contra: Clark v.
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Corp., 8 N. J. Misc. 284, 349 Atl. 828 (1930).
'Spiegel v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, Inc., 137 Misc. 698, 244 N. Y. Supp. 654 (930).
Field v. Empire Case Goods Co., 379 App. Div. 253, 166 N. Y. Supp. 509 (3937).
10 Wanamaker v. Otis Elevator Co., 228 N. Y. 392, 126 N. E. 718 (92o).
'Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Columbus McKinnon Chain Co., 13 F. (2d) 328
(W. D. N. Y. 3926).
La Frumento v. Kotex Co., 13 Misc. 314, 226 N. Y. Supp. 750 (3928).
" Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292, I8i N. E. 576 (1932); cf. Simons v. Sun
Ray Water Co., i62 N. Y. Supp. 968 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
' Doughnut Machine Corp. v. Bibbey, 65 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. ist, 1933).
' Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 2d, I939), re'g 223 Fed.
6 Cook

8oi (C. C. A. 2d, 3935) (defective wheel) ; Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 2 (defective rim on steering wheel of tractor) ; Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 345 Ky. 616, 340
S. W. i047 (393)
(defective rear seat) ; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note i
(defective wheel) ; Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 367 App. Div. 433, 353 N. Y. Supp. 13
(3915) (defective brakes); cf. Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 339 Wash. 34, 246 Pac. 945
(3926) (recovery denied because plaintiff had warning of the danger from the book of instructions and from the nature of the machine).
; Ford Motor Co. v.
" Shepard v. Kensington Steel Co., 262 Ill. App. 117, 123 (93)
Myers, 151 Miss. 73, 117 So. 362 (1928) ; Feitelberg v. Matuson, 124 Misc. 595, 597, 208
N. Y. Supp. 786, 788 (1925).
' Rosehock v. General Electric Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 34o N. E. 571 (1923). See also Hirst
(evidence of manufacturer's
v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 263 Mass. 155, 158 N. E. 332 (927)
negligence cannot be too conjectural). The courts are liberal in ordering a bill of particulars
in these cases. Drake v. National Motor Car & Vehicle Corp., 395 App. Div. 113, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 331 (3921).
'Milestone System, Inc. v. Gasior, i6o Md. 13, 352 Atl. 8io (931).

RECENT CASES
TORTS-RIGHT OF MINOR CHILD TO SUE MUNICIPALITY WHERE FATHER

Is LIABLE OVER TO CITY-The municipality, sued by a minor for injuries caused
by a defect in the pavement abutting the premises occupied by her father as
tenant, added her father and the lessor to the record as defendants.' In the lower
court, the plaintiff secured judgment against the city, and the city secured judgment against her father for the same amount of damages. There was a directed
verdict for the lessor. On appeal by the municipality, held, that the directed
verdict for the landlord was error, 2 but that plaintiff properly secured judgment
against the city despite the fact that the city could recover from her father.
Briggs v. City of Phila., 17o Atl. 871 (Pa. Super. 1934).
It is well established in Pennsylvania that a municipality is liable for injuries
resulting from sidewalk defects,3 but that it has a right of recovery over against
the abutting owner or occupant. 4 The cases formulating this rule, however, are
explicit in pointing out that the municipality's duty is essentially different from
that of the owner or occupant-liability being imposed on it for failure to discover
the defect and to compel the abutting owner or occuparnt to repair, whereas the
latter's liability is imposed for his failure to make the necessary repairs., Accordingly, the court, when it rejected the city's contention that to permit a judgment
against it under these circumstances would be in effect a violation of the wellsettled rule that a minor may not sue its parents for the latter's personal torts,6
might seem justified, from the point of view of abstract reasoning, in stressing
the independent duty of the city.7 Realistically considered, however, it is apparent
that if the city's liability will ultimately be discharged by the parent, all the reasons
for applying the parent-child doctrine might nevertheless exist. The preservation
of parental discipline and domestic tranquillity is the most generally accepted of
the various reasons advanced to explain the parent's immunity.8 While the soundness of the doctrine and its potency in securing the result stated to be its chief
justification are speculative in the absence of a scientific study of the effect on
'This procedure is sanctioned by the Sci. Fa. Act of 1929, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 12, § 141. Amended by the Act of 1931, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1933)
tit. 12, § 141.

The appellate court held that the lower court bad erroneously refused an offer of proof
that the landlord had notice of the defect in the pavement. Because of limitations of space,
the question of the landlord's liability will not be discussed herein.
'Duncan v. City of Phila., 173 Pa. 550, 34 Atl. 235 (1896) ; Mintzer v. Hogg, 192 Pa.
137, 43 Atl. 465 (1899) ; Dutton v. Lansdowne Borough, 198 Pa. 563, 48 Atl. 494 (190);
Vinnacombe v. City of Phila., 297 Pa. 564, 147 Atl. 826 (1929).
'Borough of Brookville v. Arthurs, 130 Pa. 5Ol, i8 Atl. io76 (189o) ; see also Mintzer
v. Hogg, supra note 3, at 145, 43 Atl. at 466, and cases there cited; Vinnacombe v. City of
Phila., supra note 3. In most jurisdictions, in the absence of statutes specifically imposing
liability on the abutting landowner or occupant to pedestrians, he is not liable for injuries resulting from sidewalk defects. Robbins v. Jones, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 221 (1863) ; Note (1926)
41 A. L. R. 212.
Borough of Brookville v. Arthurs, supra note 4; Lohr v. Phillipsburg, 156 Pa. 246, 27
Atl. 133 (1893) ; Dutton v. Lansdowne Borough, supra note 3.
0 Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923) ; Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242,
79 Pac. 788 (1905) (civil action for rape) ; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 285; Note (931) 71 A.
L. R. 1O71. For a scholarly and thorough-going critical analysis of the doctrine and its history, see the opinion of Peaslee, C. J., in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 15o AtI. 905
(1930). See also McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations (1929) 43 HAMv.
L. REv. lO3O.
Principal case at 872.
' McCurdy, supra note 6, at 1072 et seq. In addition to the reason noted in the text,
courts justify the rule on the following grounds: (I) Possibility of the parent's becoming
heir to the very money he paid as damages in the event the child predeceases him; (2) Depletion of the family exchequer which should be held for the benefit of all the members of
the family; (3) Analogy to the common law prohibition of similar suits by a wife against
her husband.
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family life of a suit by a child against its negligent parent, it would seem that
where matters have progressed to such a point that the child does sue, there is
little of parental dicipline and domestic tranquillity to be preserved. However
this may be, when, as in the instant case, it is not the parent but a third party
who seeks to take advantage of the child-parent rule, whatever justification
there may be for the doctrine almost totally fails. The right of a minor to sue
a negligent parent in the converse situation in which a third party is ultimately
liable, e. g., where the parent is insured, has been recognized by some few courts
which have applied the rule with discrimination and have realized that cessante
ratione, cessat ipsa lex.9 Similarly, a minor should not he refused a meritorious
claim against a third party because its parent nzay ultimately be liable,1" when the
parent does not ask the court's aid to maintain harmonious family relations.1 "
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 6; Lusk v. Lusk, 166 S. E. 538 (W. Va. 1932).
" In the instant case, for example, although it does not appear from the report, it is quite
possible that the father was judgment-proof, and that while the city had a right of action
against him, no actual satisfaction could be gained from him. This would explain the city's
appeal from the directed verdict for the landlord-which was financially responsible.
'There is some precedent for a blind application of the rule. McKelvey v. McKelvey,
11i Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664 (19o3) ; Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N. J. Misc. 849, 143 Atl. 3
(1928) (child's administrator against parent's administrator). Neither of these cases is
persuasive, since the New Jersey opinion is that of a single nisi prius judge and neither opinion is convincingly reasoned.

